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The Atlantic Prehistory of Private International Law: 
Trading Companies of the New World and the Pursuit of Restitution  
in England and France, 1613-1643. 
 
This article concerns itself with the kind of legal conflicts that broke out in the Atlantic 
New World between merchant interests from different European loci. Case studies are 
made of two disputes: one between Samuel Argall of the Virginia Company and a factor 
on behalf of Antoinette de Pons at the Île des Monts-Déserts, and the other between the 
Compagnie de Caën and the Kirke brothers on the St Lawrence River. Together, these 
case studies reveal how important it was for merchant interests to have resident 
ambassadors and state officials advancing their interests in England and France. 
Procedural difficulties and jurisdictional uncertainty often impeded the road to redress, 
it is shown. Additionally, this article suggests that the peacetime reckoning of events 
associated with warfare provided an optimal opportunity for disaffected private actors 
to have their claims for redress recognised. The extent to which private overtures for 
restitution relied upon public acts of diplomacy reveals some of the reasons why it is 
not possible to date the origins of private international law before the long nineteenth 
century. Rather we might profitably identify, in events such as these, the prehistory of 
private international law. 
 
 
A striking characteristic of European activity in the seventeenth-century New World was the 
greater involvement and agency of trading companies. While some of these companies were 
rogue agglomerates of traders, most others were officially endorsed entities, ranging in size 
from the intimate syndicates of local entrepôt merchants to the much larger, monopolistic, 
joint-stock corporations. It has been for a long time well understood that companies of this kind 
played an important role in the foundation of early modern empires. Historical research in just 
the last decade has begun to yield more nuanced appraisals of the East India companies in 
particular and their relationships both with founding imperial polities and also with non-
European communities, following the pioneering interventions of Philip J. Stern in The 
Company-State.1 What appears to be less understood, and more especially so in the Atlantic 
context, are some of the demands that the relationships between companies of different 
European origin abroad made upon the existing legal and political institutions of Europe. When 
companies infringed upon the rights of each other in highly contested and sometimes judicially 
unsophisticated parts of the extra-European world, what means of redress, if any, were 
available to the disaffected interests back in Europe? An enquiry of this type must necessarily 
pay some deference to Lauren Benton, whose research into the comparative history of 
jurisdictional politics and legal pluralism in the extra-European world has yielded a number of 
remarkable findings for historians of early modern imperialism.2 This approach has recently 
culminated in A Search for Sovereignty (2010). Revealing how a variety of legal conflicts, 
generally perceived to be of a criminal nature, allowed for the opportunistic construction of 
sovereignty by Europeans abroad, Benton identifies some of the geographical variations 
between different ‘corridors’ and ‘enclaves’ of law.3 This article, by contrast, will be concerned 
with colonial contexts where spaces of this kind were yet to be carved out of the ports, 
coastlines, and townships of the seventeenth-century New World. Here trading companies were 
neck and neck, falling often into dispute with one another.  
 
In the New World, private actors from different European backgrounds made little recourse to 
indigenous systems of arbitration, as they typically believed themselves to be operating in areas 
deficient of the judicial institutions capable of resolving their conflicts. This was especially the 
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case concerning the unbiased acknowledgement of trespass in disputed foreign territories and 
liability for non-contractual wrongs generally in private law (what was firming into tort in the 
English legal tradition, and délit civil in the French), in the absence of which there could be no 
pursuit of restitution for damages. There was no court in colonial America, for instance, that 
could oblige French traders to observe English jurisdiction, just as there was no court in 
colonial America that could oblige English traders to observe French jurisdiction. Even if there 
were courts of this kind, there could be no guarantee of the impartiality of their adjudications. 
And there was little that Europeans could bring with them into the New World to extricate 
themselves from this condition of jurisdictional deficit, making exception only for ‘letters of 
marque and reprisal’, which were not easy to come by. Documents of this kind had been issued 
throughout the Middle Ages to facilitate restitution for subjects from whom property had been 
unjustly seized beyond their own realm and were therefore in the absence of normal recourse. 
Upon receiving letters of marque from their own local authorities, aggrieved subjects could 
then collaborate for the purpose of seeking the restoration of their property or the equivalent 
compensation.4 Importantly, wherever these documents allowed for the restitution of property, 
this provision was only applicable to moveable property. Essentially, these letters provided a 
public endorsement of a particular private law interest abroad, and in that sense, had to be taken 
seriously by foreign recipients during the latter Middle Ages, lest their actions attract even 
greater attention from foreign war-making sovereigns. From the fifteenth century onwards, the 
political audacity of these documents ensured that they were typically used only in contexts of 
open war, or contexts in which provocative restitution was expected to bring about the 
declaration of open war or reprisals in return. Letters of marque and reprisal therefore 
represented an exceptional, unreliable, and controversial means of seeking redress in the 
seventeenth-century New World. Less functional still for this kind of purpose was a colonial 
charter, regardless of the delusions sometimes held by those who carried one into the New 
World and irrespective of the ceremonialism superficially attached to it. Charters, commissions, 
donationsbrev, lettres, octrooien, patents, and other legal instruments of the same kind were 
specific to particular jurisdictions and particular subjects, and none were capable of imposing 
any kind of obligation upon foreign Christians. In continuity with medieval tradition, sovereign 
donations of property and jurisdiction affected only those subjects loyal to the same sovereign 
and could not lawfully impinge upon the liberties of others.5 On their own, charters could not 
transplant judicial mechanisms into foreign territories capable of mediating between 
individuals from different political and legal backgrounds. In sum, then, trading companies 
operating so far away from their founding jurisdictions were easily stalemated when they fell 
into conflict with one another, regardless of the prestige and privilege of receiving official 
sanction in domestic and metropolitan political settings. 
 
In Europe, sovereigns personally showed some ambivalence towards the foreign affairs of 
trading companies. While it was not uncommon for kings and queens to take up the cudgels 
for individual subjects during the earliest stages of the ‘age of discovery’, a slight move away 
from this approach can be detected in the early seventeenth century first of all in England, 
where James I/VI dissociated himself from all responsibility over the actions of the London 
and Plymouth Companies almost immediately after their incorporation by his seals. Complain 
as the Spaniards did vehemently in a number of European courts about the Virginia project 
throughout 1609, during a time of formal peace between England and Spain, the official line 
in response was that ‘his Majesty pleads that the undertaking is a private one and that he cannot 
interfere’, as the Venetian ambassador to England conveyed at the time.6 In the period between 
1600 and 1670 – between the first significant challenges levelled against Iberian overseas 
supremacy by France, England, and the United Dutch Provinces, and the definitive adoption 
by those states of the political economy of mercantilism – private legal interests were cast 
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abroad into foreign waters and increasingly dissociated from those of their public sovereigns. 
More and more, instead, it was left up to stationed diplomats to advocate on behalf of their 
merchant countrymen, doing so generally in the language of Roman law. As a result, the 
purview of renaissance diplomacy expanded to take in diverse issues of a private law nature, 
additional to those specific matters of public law originally under its mandate. This marks a 
significant transformation from the types of duties traditionally associated with resident 
ambassadors.7 Increasingly, an officially stationed representative appeared not just for his 
sovereign, but for certain subjects of his sovereign too. He did so by furnishing depositions 
from abroad for use in local courts, by advocating for his fellow subjects imprisoned for debts 
and defaults, and by negotiating with royal, noble, and merchant interests in commercial 
matters. His successes were mixed.  
 
This article seeks to contribute to our understandings of diplomacy, imperialism, and private 
law in this window by focusing in particular upon conflicts associated with the New World. 
Regardless of the persistence of ambassadorial advocates on behalf of private interests in this 
new moment, efforts to secure reparations for damaged private interests were constrained, 
firstly, by the insufficiency of established judicatures in Europe and, secondly, by the fitfulness 
of public warfare across the continent, as this article will explain. It was never obvious to 
statesmen, jurists, and least of all merchants, how private legal disputes of an international 
nature could be brought to courts unused to hearing them, all while the select community of 
European nations arbitrated their own differences through chaotic and often spontaneous 
battles fought increasingly far away from their own set patriae. What emerges from the 
archives is a most confusing legal context which can be characterised neither by singularity 
nor by fixity. This is a finding that runs contrary to the implication, unintended though it might 
be, of those arguments which hold that a fluid and complex state of legal pluralism was a 
distinctive feature of the frontiers and coastlines of the colonial world. Rather, it will be 
proposed here that the politics of jurisdiction in the history of early modern imperialism were 
just as significant in the Old World as they were in the New World. 
 
What were the procedural and jurisdictional difficulties raised by conflicts between foreign 
merchants before the development of state-centric mercantilism? And how did the changing 
circumstances of war and peace influence the options available to disaffected private interests 
of this kind? Focusing on the relationships between English and French trading companies in 
the North American New World, this article proceeds to answer these questions by recounting 
two separate disputes and following them through to their dissipations.  
 
The first part of the article considers the destruction and despoliation of several French 
settlements on the North Atlantic coastline by Samuel Argall of the Virginia Company. 
Throughout 1614, members of the French syndicate behind these settlements appealed to the 
crown, and from there a claim for damages was passed onto the Privy Council via the French 
ambassador in London. This was different to most other extra-European legal conflicts, and all 
of those concerning the continent, because the property at stake was both moveable and 
immoveable. Here, in other words, land as much as things was up for grabs in international law 
– and as ever, the distinctions between public and private were to be blurred in pursuit of 
restitution. The Virginia Company responded to French demands in a statement that is well 
known to historians. At the risk of making too much of the overtly loyalist language adopted 
by all English chartered companies during this period (and for some time after it), this 
extraordinary document can be shown to represent a bold declaration of the extent of English 
royal authority over the New World.8 On the other hand, it seems probably more appropriate 
in the context of this dispute to regard the document as an expression of the London entity’s 
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corporate privileges and responsibilities, and from that starting point, proceed to consider the 
points of law which had to be overcome in order to escape a private obligation of restitution. 
Escape from this obligation the company did in the end, helped more so by the reluctance of 
the Privy Council to offer a ruling on the matter than anything else.  
 
The second part of the article considers the capture of Québec and the confiscation of 
inventories belonging to the Compagnie de Caën and the Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France 
during two raids by the Kirke brothers for themselves, their backers, and their family trading 
company. Justifying their behaviour by holding up obscure letters of marque, the Kirkes 
committed their first depredations in 1628, during a time of public war, and their second 
depredations in 1629, as hostilities were ceasing. While much has been made of the resolve of 
ambassadorial representatives for both crowns in the negotiations leading up to the restoration 
of Québec and Acadia, much less has been made of the separate issues of private law involved.9 
Records of negotiation at Susa and Saint-Germain-en-Laye during the organisation of a 
working peace after the Anglo-French War allow historians to piece together only one side of 
the story. Another side of the story can be presented by balancing out the flummoxed opinions 
of ambassadors, solicitors, and judges, heard in the ill-equipped courts of England and France, 
as they were confronted to repair the individual interests damaged during the events of 1628-
9. These matters represented more difficult questions than the public negotiations which kept 
diplomats busy, and they took longer to resolve, principally because of the incapacities, at the 
time, of existing legal institutions on both sides of the Channel.  
 
THE VIRGINIA COMPANY OF LONDON AND THE MARQUISE OF 
GUERCHEVILLE  
 
The Virginia Company of London was first chartered in 1606 alongside the Virginia Company 
of Plymouth. They were to be neighbours – Plymouth to the north up to the Bay of Fundy and 
London to the south down to Cape Fear – until the Plymouth corporation became defunct and 
the London corporation received new charters for itself in 1609 and 1612.10 Despite assuming 
the right to operate in the northern component of the grant, the Virginia Company of London 
would retain its original focus on the southern component of the grant. Here, Jamestown 
became the principal locus of settlement, wracked intermittently, though it was, with famine 
throughout this period. So dire was the need for victuals that the Virginia Company became 
accustomed to trading its precious commodities for corn and cod up north, following the 
success of an expedition led by Samuel Argall in 1612.11  
 
French interest along the St. Lawrence River predated both Virginia projects, although 
permanent sites of settlement would not be established by small trading companies until 1603 
at Tadoussac, and 1608 at Québec, and 1610 at Port-Royal. Indeed, ‘Nouvelle-France’ was 
always something of a revolving door.12 Partially this was due to the steady trickle of lettres 
and commissions from kings to jostling sieurs – a trend which began during the reign of Henri 
IV (1589-1610) and would not abate until the accession of Cardinal Richelieu to premier 
ministre in 1624.13 In the middle of this window, René le Coq de la Saussaye agreed to lead a 
small expedition across the Atlantic to found a new settlement, ‘Saint-Sauveur’. Confirming 
his participation, he entered into a contract in August of 1612 with his sponsoring syndicate, 
comprised of Jean de Biencourt de Poutrincourt and Antoinette de Pons, the Marquise of 
Guercheville.14 After winter in early 1613, La Saussaye along with a small crew and a modest 
Jesuit entourage left Le Havre in the Jonas for the Île des Monts-Déserts, the projected site of 
Saint-Sauveur.  
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It was in this very springtime window that Argall and a crew of sixty men were dispatched on 
another food-finding mission for the Virginia Company, edging northwards along the 
American coast in the Adventure. They would go no further north than the Penobscot River, 
for here Argall spied the Jonas along with a smaller pinnace docked near Saint-Sauveur at the 
very earliest stages of its fortification. The French under La Saussaye had been settling in for 
little more than a month before Argall made his advance in July. The Englishmen stormed the 
Jonas, and quickly moved to take control of Mount Desert Island, slaying three Frenchmen 
who resisted their approach and causing the flight into the woods of many others. It cannot be 
known with any certainty who it was that fired the first shot in this affray, but the record is 
unanimous about the rapidity of the French submission to Argall. Surrender was very quick.15  
 
Mayhem followed. Sheepishly La Saussaye boarded the Jonas, overrun by Englishmen, to beg 
wherefore. Argall explained that he found their settlement within the limits of Virginia as 
declared in the Virginia charters, and prompted La Saussaye to prove what right he had to 
establish a settlement here. To this, La Saussaye claimed his authority came from his French 
king, so he should be treated ‘not as a robber, but upon an equal footing’. His proof of this, La 
Saussaye assured Argall, was the commission locked away in the chest on the Jonas. In front 
of Argall and his crew, together with those of the French who surrendered (including Maître 
Charles Fleury of the Jonas, and the Jesuit Father Biard from whose relation this story 
principally derives), La Saussaye removed the keys from his pocket and opened the chest to 
reveal ‘everything else untouched and in its proper place, but no commission’.16 When the mist 
settled on this farcical scene, Argall saw red. Offended at the blatancy of this French affront to 
the Virginia Company of London, he made the equation that the French were ‘forbans & 
pirates’ under the authority of nobody special, which led him to the radical conclusion that 
their booty was therefore claimable for Virginia. He took whatever salt and fishing equipment 
he could and piled it into the Adventure; La Saussaye and some of his crew were crammed onto 
a meagre fishing boat and pushed in the direction of France; Biard, Fleury, and the rest were 
carried back to Jamestown as captives on the Adventure, which was trailed by the latest addition 
to the company’s fleet, the Jonas.17  
 
Upon his return to Jamestown, Argall was promptly ordered by the council to head north before 
the imminent arrival of winter not only to loot from the remaining French but also to destroy 
all signs of French occupation. Evidently it was more concerning that the French were 
fortifying settlements on land than it was that they were habitually fishing just off the coast. 
Argall outfitted the Jonas and the Capitanesse, and appointing the captive Frenchmen as his 
guides, He made again for Saint-Sauveur, reaching the Île des Monts-Déserts in October just 
as he left it. Here he ordered what remained of Saint-Sauveur to be dismantled, destroying also 
the French markers at the site. Next, Argall and his fleet moved to the abandoned settlement of 
Île Sainte-Croix. Here he did the same. Finally, Argall reached Port-Royal, which was 
somewhat different to the other sites.18 Allegedly, this was Poutrincourt’s personal settlement. 
Here the land was divided into strips and granted to farming censitaires ‘habituated to the 
country’, Rameau tells us, ‘and determined to stay’, under the management of Poutrincourt’s 
son, Charles de Biencourt.19 But, for whatever reason, neither Biencourt nor any of 
Pourtincourt’s censitaires were around to defend the settlement at the time of Argall’s arrival 
in November of 1613. The settlement appeared, instead, to lie vacant, except for some 
livestock, which Argall either destroyed or led onto the ships. Likewise, after taking whatever 
of the grain and vegetables that would keep fresh, Argall and his men then destroyed the fields 
of crops. Finally Argall ordered all the buildings in the young colony to be razed. Leaving Port-
Royal reaped of its natural bounties and burning in flames, Argall and his fleet pulled out of 
the port with his loot and made a course home for Jamestown.20 But they did not sail far before 
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a fateful storm gathered overhead and erupted to disperse the fleet. Argall in the Capitanesse 
was diverted towards Manhattan Island. After a comical run-in with the Dutch he found there, 
Argall pulled out of the Hudson River and made southward for Virginia, which it reached 
sometime in December.21 The suffering Jonas in the meantime embarked upon a more trying 
journey. By heavy winds the vessel was blown far into the Atlantic. Among its passengers were 
Father Biard and a few other French captives, who became desperate for fresh food and water 
until necessities were finally provided for at Azores. From there, the Jonas aimed for 
England.22  
 
When news of the French losses reached France in October of 1613, the outcry was instant. 
The old and venerated constable of France, Henri de Montmorency, ‘in the name of France’, 
and on behalf of the Marquise de Guercheville, who was ‘particularly interested in this loss’, 
promptly made three requests directly to King James: 
 
one, that you will command that the two Jesuit Fathers be returned in safety with the 
other prisoners; the other, that the restitution be made [for this] remarkable plundering 
[‘volerie’], which cost the said Dame more than a hundred thousand livres of loss; and 
the third, that your Council or Société of Virginia will declare and explicate where they 
intend to set the boundaries and confines of the said country of Virginia.23  
 
Signing off on his letter of solicitude for the Madame de Pons, Montmorency insisted to the 
English king that the Sieur de Bisseaux, Samuel Spifames, be kept informed of his response. 
This was sensible. As the French Ambassador to England, Spifames was ideally situated to 
pick up the mantle (and, indeed, the ongoing correspondence which Spifames instigated with 
the French foreign minister, the Marquis de Sillery Pierre Brûlart, on the topic, suggests that 
he took more than a passing interest in the affair while based in London). That Argall was ‘not 
a pirate without commission’, but an ‘employee of the company established to traffic into 
Virginia’, gave the incident an intriguing character in Spifames’s appraisal, over and above the 
fact that Argall’s actions on the Île des Monts-Deserts were ‘not only illegally contrary to the 
bond of amity between two nations bound by confederations and treaties, but also contrary to 
the law of nations’.24 His opinion was no different when the battered Jonas pulled into 
Pembroke some moths later carrying news of the destruction of Port-Royal, prompting 
Spifames to redouble his efforts on the matter of restitution. In May of 1614, the ambassador 
sent a message to Brûlart calling for more pressure to be applied from Louis XIII on the 
question of ‘Port Royal, ancient discovery of the French, and in their possession for more than 
sixty years before the English were cognisant of Virginia, which [the English] entirely 
demolished, ravishing its produce and other commodities belonging to the poor French’. The 
damages inflicted not just upon the Jonas but upon the entire settlement demanded restitution 
to his diplomatic mind (but then again, so did a great many things, of which the catch of the 
day in the Greenland seas was only slightly the bigger concern of his in this period).25  
 
The French complaints addressed to King James about the Jonas were diverted to the Privy 
Council in February, which was not an unusual destination for petitions adverting to the 
absence of ordinary justice. By the early Stuart period, the Privy Council – typically comprised 
of about twenty or so members, including the secretary of state, and sometimes the king himself 
– had developed a mediative and investigative jurisdiction over a wide range of ‘weightie 
matters of the Realme’, both private and public.26 Just as the Privy Council often went out of 
its way to protect English merchant interests at home and abroad, so in return it was equally 
prepared to receive petitions concerning foreign interests, and to arbitrate if only to give the 
appearance of justice.27 And this is indeed how the Privy Council looked to intervene early in 
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the case of the Marquise, by their resolution to summon Argall ‘for restitution and punishment’, 
upon his return into England when more information on the affray would arrive to hand.28  
 
A month or so later, additional pressure on the case came from an unlikely source in the form 
of La Saussaye himself, who was sent to London personally to rehearse the complaints of his 
employer, De Pons, about the Jonas and her alleged out-of-pocket loss of 100,000 livres.29 This 
figure, which is consistent with the amount originally declared on her behalf by Montmorency 
the previous October and equated to somewhere near £10,000 sterling, is difficult to fathom 
without some appreciation of the interests that were personally involved in the dispute. In 1603, 
Henri IV granted the rights of seigneurie and monopoly in Canada to Pierre du Gua de Monts. 
De Monts had been a regular visitor to the Saint-Laurent in the 1590s, and was backed by a 
company of merchants from separate situations along the western coast of France.30 He was 
accompanied by Samuel de Champlain and Poutrincourt on an expedition of 1604, when Port 
Royal caught the latter’s eye. Poutrincourt requested the whole beach and vast hinterland in 
seigneurie as a ‘don’ from de Monts in August of 1604.31 A contract to this effect prepared, 
Poutrincourt then approached Henri IV in early 1606 to have the donation confirmed. This 
afforded some certainty for him, and his son Beincourt, for little more than a year, because the 
king soon changed his mind on the struggling De Monts’s company and revoked the original 
privileges of 1603.32 Poutrincourt’s deed to Port-Royal was brought into question with this 
revocation, and was then rendered more questionable still when Henri IV died and was replaced 
by the interim regency of Marie de Médicis, anticipating the succession of Louis XIII. In order 
to realise his dreams of living large in l’Acadie, Poutrincourt was forced to find a new link to 
the royal court. This he found in the form of Madame de Pons, the Marquise of Guercheville, 
wife of the Duke of Liencourt and Governor of Paris Charles du-Plessis. De Pons was eager to 
dispatch Jesuit missionaries to Canada for the purpose of converting the indigenous population 
to Catholicism, for which reason she was a driving force behind the Compagnie de Jesus. In 
her religious fervour, she was nothing like Poutrincourt who, for whatever else he may have 
claimed in order to attract support, was primarily motivated to have the lands in and around 
Port-Royal preserved to his family and left in the custodianship of his son, Biencourt.33 These 
were the circumstances which brought Poutrincourt and De Pons into a singular concern. De 
Pons being a woman, her contrat d’association with Poutrincourt was only possible in the 
presence of her husband, with whose authority their syndicate was formed.34 From 
Champlain’s account of this transaction – compiled on what authority it cannot be certain – De 
Pons was highly sceptical of the rights to land Poutrincourt claimed to possess. She demanded 
to see written titles, which Poutrincourt refused to show, and so insisted on the conveyance of 
‘all rights, actions, and claims he has or ever had in New France’.35 Neither is it clear what of 
these privileges were still valid in 1611 nor how much the Marquise paid for them, but the 
endorsement of the purchase by the Regent appears to have given some assurances that the title 
to all of l’Acadie (minus Poutrincourt’s claim to Port-Royal) was reconstituted and seamlessly 
affixed to the Guercheville estate. 
 
In this light can the demand for 100,000 livres be appreciated. If the initial capital outlay of 
Poutrincourt and De Pons can be approximated at 750 livres each (as La Saussaye’s 
reconnaissance implies), and, on top of that, the burdens unique to Saint-Sauveur – namely, 
the costs of mustering and sending out the Jesuits, and the value of the improvements made to 
the settlement before its demolition – are accounted for charitably, an estimate reaches no more 
than a tenth of that grand figure.36 Perhaps the Jonas was expected to find gold in New France. 
Or, what is more likely, to be accounted for on top of this is the compensation requisite to quit 
the claim to the Île des Monts-Déserts. The suit’s origin not with the near-bankrupted 
Poutrincourt, but with the noblewoman de Pons (whose contract of 1611 apparently gave her 
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title of the land in question), might offer further confirmation that the amount represented a 
claim for the reimbursement of a failed speculative investment in real estate abroad, rather than 
just the value of the things damaged or carried off by Argall to Virginia, or otherwise the 
anticipated returns of the voyage. In that sense, the claim for 100,000 livres represented an 
unusually complicated demand for private restitution, which begged for jurisdiction, but for 
which in 1614 there was little precedent to insist upon extending.  
 
At the beginning of June, Spifames lost no opportunity to address the new secretary of state, 
and former ambassador to the Hague, Sir Ralph Winwood – by happenstance also a director of 
the Virginia Company of London – on the matter of the Jonas.37 In Winwood’s mind, the 
battered sloop was a relatively easy matter to decide upon. After the ship and everything in it 
was released sometime around the 22nd of June, there was nothing more to be done.38 The 
secretary of state was blasé in his deflection of the dame’s further demands, telling Spifames 
that ‘she has no reason to complain, nor to expect any reparation’.39 The French thought very 
differently. In August, Spifames instructed Maître Fleury, now safely in Rouen, to prepare a 
detailed report on the Saint-Sauveur incident, which was compiled and eventually passed onto 
the Privy Council afterwards.40 In October, Antoinette de Pons addressed Winwood personally, 
with the request that he ‘uphold the reparation of a grand tort’, using legalese which clearly 
confirmed – if indeed any confirmation was required by those implicated in her allegations – 
that the matter was one of private law which demanded principled deliberation irrespective of 
the division between their respective civil jurisdictions. ‘I promise’, De Pons forebode, ‘that I 
will be obliged to you as a result of what will come from such a just restitution’.41 Spifames 
too was reluctant to let the matter subside, chivvying enthusiastically for the acknowledgement 
of ‘the particular interest of madame the marquise of Quiercheville’, which, in his mind, surely 
‘merited recompense’ after the destruction of Saint-Sauveur.42  
 
The Virginia Company had different ideas about the matter. Sometime amid all of this, an 
official statement was compiled in London for the directors – maybe by Richard Martin, lawyer 
to the company from 1612, or perhaps it was William Crashaw, the company’s learned preacher 
– in response to the enquiries of the Privy Council.43 Without any contradiction, the company’s 
statement is deferential to its progenitors yet boldly declaratory of its own individual 
personality. The most obvious indication of this arises in the company’s comprehensive 
assumption of responsibility for Argall’s actions. For both ransacking voyages, Argall held 
‘severall com[m]issions’ from the company, and was under the explicit ‘commande of the 
Gov[ernor] of our Colonye, by his Comisssion to him given under the Seale of the Colonye, & 
by virtue of such authoritye as is to him derived from His Ma[jesty’s] Great Seale of England’. 
The French differences, the document’s author stresses on no less than a few occasions, were 
not with Argall personally, and much less with the king’s council, but were above all others 
with the Virginia Company and its ‘Colonye’. From this basis, the corporation offered its 
rejection of the French claims. Addressing the summer ransacking of Saint-Sauveur, the 
company admitted to taking a ‘french Shipp’, but as it was ‘taken between 43 and 44 Degrees’, 
it was therefore ‘within the Limitts of our Colony […] wee haveinge granted unto us from 36 
to 45 Degrees of no[rth] Latitude, & from E. to W. from one sea to another’. When Argall 
discovered that the French intended to ‘get Land’ and ‘plante contrarye to the extente and 
Priviledge’ of the company, the Virginia council found itself forced to defer to a ‘certaine 
Clause’ of the company’s royal charters which rendered it ‘Lawfull for our Gov[er]nor to resist, 
displante, & take by force any that shoulde make such attempte’. This was untrue, of course, 
as none of the Virginia charters permitted aggression against foreign subjects, but it was up to 
the French, now, to call the bluff. In the meantime, the corporation admitted some culpability; 
though it played down all French allegations of Argall’s ‘inhumanitye’, the Virginia Company 
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estimated that the value of the goods stolen from Saint-Saueveur could amount to no more than 
£200 sterling (approximately 2,000 livres).44 
 
The document turned next to address the subsequent ransacking of Poutrincourt’s Port-Royal. 
Argall’s conduct was lawful, the corporation found, because of the ‘com[m]ission given to him 
under the Seale of the Colonye’, which instructed him to demolish all ‘reliques of any 
fortificac[i]on, or other markes of clayme, or Plantac[i]on to the [said] Porte’. As the settlement 
was found ‘within 44 degrees or thereabouts, and within the Limitts, and precincte of our 
Colonye’, it was Poutrincourt who was at fault, not the Virginia Company. Besides all of this, 
the settlement was entirely ‘abandoned’. Argall had ‘found not one’ settler at Port Royal. In 
order, then, to perfect ‘the Clayme, & tytle of our Sayde Colonye to [tha]t Saide P[orte]’, the 
corporation had no choice but to commission Argall, with its own seal, to remove ‘all such 
silent p[re]tence & ensig[ns] of Dominion’. These actions were right, the Virginia Company 
stressed, not only because the French were temporarily absent from Port-Royal, but because 
the French had not been physically present in northeastern America until after the formation of 
the first Virginia charters. The only exception to this rule which the company was prepared to 
make was for Québec. This was considered the only place that the French had ‘any footinge’ 
in the New World. Everywhere else, the company had come first. For that reason, the company 
concluded, 
 
the Kinge of France is neither in his Hon[ours] nor tytle any waye injuryed by the Just 
Defence of our owne [… nor] hath Madam de Guerchevile any reason to expecte 
reparac[i]on havinge entered without our Leave, with[in] ou[r] Limitts and dominion, 
by force to plante, or trade contrarye to the good correspondence, & League of those 
two most royall Kings.45  
  
That completed the statement, which removed the corporation singularly from any obligation 
to repair the damaged interest of De Pons. In the process, by way of a marginal argument, it 
ridiculed the absentee proprietorship of Poutrincout. Its allegations were not without some 
glaring logical deficiencies. By referring to the privileges afforded to the company by James I 
of England in this defence, the Virginia Company was framing the matter as an international 
dispute that would have been incredibly difficult, in the period, to have arbitrated. Comparing 
royal paperwork across monarchies was practically impossible, and besides this, was 
theoretically pointless on questions of company charters, insofar as donative documents of the 
kind established exclusive rights and conditions to be observed only by subjects of the monarch 
issuing them.46 Resolving this particular dispute would have been made all the more difficult 
by La Saussaye’s missing commission, which might not have even existed (despite the 
suggestions of Fleury and Biard to the contrary), as there is no proof elsewhere of its delivery.47 
Accompanying the Virginia Company’s fickle argument based on exclusive royal grants was 
the seemingly contradictory placement of the onus of physical occupation upon the French. It 
was not considered that this argument, which was mobilised only in application to Argall’s 
second lots of ransackings when the Acadiens were either kept captive or temporarily absent 
at the time, could just as easily have counted against the Virginia Companies of London and 
Plymouth, neither of which had any attachment to the region in this period (regardless of the 
great fib delivered by Argall to Christiaenszoon the year earlier in Manhattan). There was, 
therefore, much audacity to the claims of English authority abroad too; whether or not the 
French had full enough access to the appropriate legal institutions to challenge them was 
another question though. 
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In the end, Winwood’s original assessment that De Pons had no grounds for a claim was 
upheld. But this was most likely due to the Privy Council declining jurisdiction over such a 
thorny matter than it was to any principled argument tendered by the Virginia Company. There 
would be no remedy for the French in England or in America. The last anything is reported of 
it comes just before Christmas in 1614, when Sir Thomas Edmondes, ambassador to France, 
told Winwood of his embarrassment for being summonsed before a royal audience in Paris 
where he was shamed publicly by the French queen. That De Pons ‘was forced to make an 
extraordinary instance for the redress’ of her losses was still a matter of some gravity at this 
stage, evidently.48 But the matter was on its way into memory. De Pons was not awarded the 
sum of 100,000 livres from the Virginia Company of London after diplomatic pressure on the 
case waned on both sides of the Channel. She was left with one option, and that was to 
encourage her husband to bring an action for his contract with De Monts on her behalf. That 
no suit of this kind ever materialised ensured that De Pons, for all her Catholic zeal, would 
become memorable in Canadian history only as the first of many after her to lose out in a high-
risk investment in colonial land.  
 
THE BROTHERS KIRKE AND THE COMPAGNIE DE CAËN 
 
Europe was plunged into the Thirty Years War from 1618. A brittle alliance between England 
and France only disintegrated, however, after the rise of the expansionist Cardinal Richelieu to 
premier ministre in August of 1624 and the succession of Charles I to the English throne in 
March of 1625.49 Throughout 1626 and in the early months of 1627, England and France 
descended piecemeal into conflict following the differences of opinion between their kings 
over debt, dowry, and denomination. These were the triggers to a war definitively underway 
after the attempted English siege of Saint-Martin-de-Ré in the summertime of 1627, and fought 
principally off the French coast until the Treaty of Susa of April 1629.50  
 
It was within this wartime window that the Kirke family business shifted its sights from Europe 
to Québec. Previously, the Kirkes had been involved in the acquisition and redistribution of 
wine, an enterprise entirely autochthonous to the Channel.51 By the 1620s, Gervaise Kirke, the 
family patriarch, had fostered important mostly Huguenot networks at La Rochelle and Dieppe 
for this purpose. Following the French seizure of merchant wine vessels at Bordeaux at the 
beginning of 1627, this family business, which had thrived on the dual loyalties of the Kirke 
family, became no longer feasible.52 With war came a new commercial opportunity for the 
Kirkes to engage in a ‘proxy war’ for Charles I.53 This was a job Gervaise left to his sons. It 
would be David Kirke, for his brothers, who ‘obtained letters of marque’ from the delegates of 
Charles I on December 17th, 1627, which authorised (it can only be presumed) their capture of 
French prizes in the Atlantic during the Anglo-French War.54  
 
By this time, the French presence on the Saint-Laurent and in l’Acadie had grown even more 
conflicted than it was before. Interlopers remained the problem they always had been, but on 
top of this, there were separate companies claiming exclusive rights in the region too. Into this 
situation stepped a new monopoly, in the form of the Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France, which 
was freshly endorsed to consolidate French interests. Emerging from the winter of 1627/8, the 
first to descend upon Canada after the creation of the new company, were Samuel de 
Champlain and the seventy-odd inhabitants of Québec desperate for provisions from home. 
Fortunately, the Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France was outfitting a number of ships to be sent 
out to him in the new year, and most of these left Dieppe for Québec in April. Unfortunately 
for Champlain, however, another fleet of three ships – commanded by the French-born Kirke 
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brothers – had left England for the Saint-Laurent with designs to raid the French settlements 
just weeks before the departure of the Compagnie’s fleet.  
 
The Kirkes were the first to reach the Saint-Laurent by some four weeks. In that time, they 
collected prisoners from Cap Tourmente and Tadoussac, and hijacked a handful of ships, 
including a number of small fishing vessels and, eventually, even one of the vessels laden with 
precious provisions sent by the new company. In early July, David Kirke dropped anchor at 
Tadoussac, where the signs of French settlement were replaced by Charles I’s coat of arms, 
and the site claimed for himself and his brothers. From Tadoussac, David Kirke ordered a party 
of ships back downriver to pillage and destroy the remaining French settlements, reserving one 
of the captured Basque ships, which he delivered upriver to Québec with a letter for 
Champlain.55 Dated July 18th, 1628, Kirke declared in this letter that the ‘Commission of the 
King of Great Britain’ provided justification not only for the ‘seizure of cattle’ and ‘boats’, but 
also for the ‘taking possession of the lands known as Canada & Acadia’ itself.56 Kirke was 
probably being disingenuous here, but again we cannot know. Conventionally, the function of 
wartime letters of marque was to facilitate the taking or retaking of moveable property, not 
immoveable property. These, at least, were the conventions of maritime Europe, even if they 
appeared not to apply to Atlantic America in this case; or, otherwise, the subtlety of any such 
distinction was lost on Champlain and his closest advisors who, in their response to Kirke, 
admitted that ‘we are in no doubt about the commissions you have obtained from the King of 
great Britain’.57 In the rest of his deferential reply to the Kirkes, Champlain may have conceded 
that a great honour had been given to the brothers to execute these, the ‘commandments’ of 
their king Charles I, but Champlain remained defiant in his refusal to surrender. For, he wrote, 
‘by dying in combat we will be honourable’. Downplaying the importance of his losses, and 
bluffing about an abundance of food reserves in storage at Québec, Champlain was brave in 
response, but overly optimistic. It is apparent that he expected imminently the arrival of the 
rest of the fleet sent by the Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France with its fresh provisions and 
reinforcements. He was therefore probably devastated when he learned of the surrender of these 
ships to the Kirkes with only the smallest of shows of resistance.58 
 
The expedition of the Kirke brothers had yielded plenty of fruit, and quickly: having only 
reached the Saint-Laurent in May, by August, Cap Tourmente was destroyed and pillaged, 
Tadoussac was occupied, Québec was seriously threatened, 900 Frenchmen were imprisoned, 
and some two dozen new ships, along with all their provisions and munitions, were taken as 
prize. Content with their plunder and fearful, perhaps, of the arrival of French backup, the 
Kirkes decided to leave Champlain in Québec and make their return to England without delay. 
The brothers convoyed six of the best prize ships, which were to be sold upon their return to 
England if not along the way. A few other ships were disarmed and filled with the French 
captives, and given the freedom to return home. The rest of the captured fleet – the meeker 
fishing ships – were ignited and left to disintegrate atop the river’s surface.59  
 
The return of the Kirkes to England at the end of summer caught the attention of many, and 
inspired something of a revival of enthusiasm among noblemen and merchants about the 
prospect of taking Québec. The legality of their prizes went unquestioned – claimed as they 
were during a period of public war and under the authority of a written commission – and the 
prospect for much greater gains abroad was suddenly championed.60 Over in France, nearing 
what would be the denouement of war, royal forces were making much progress on their goal 
of repelling the Protestant presence from along the coast. As the captive ships released from 
the Kirkes pulled into port, the besieged La Rochelle was undergoing a momentous 
transformation into a bastion of Catholic French control – an event that marked the beginning 
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of the end for Charles I’s designs across the Channel.61 Before the political ramifications of 
this recapture could entirely be felt in England, however, the Kirkes were making for New 
France again in March of 1629 in six ships and two pinnaces. Once more they sailed in advance 
of ships sent by the Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France and an older interest, the Compagnie de 
Caën, but this time, their head-start would not be advantageous. 
 
Expecting replenishment again in the spring, Champlain was met again by the Kirkes. When 
one of the pinnaces, displaying a white flag, meandered towards Champlain along the Saint-
Laurent in July, it carried a letter from Lewis and Thomas.62 ‘Monsieur’, it ran, ‘you must hand 
over the fort and habitation into our hands’.63 Reading this, a dejected Champlain had no choice 
but to declare his inability to resist the brothers in the manner he had the year earlier. But his 
surrender, while inevitable, was contingent on a few conditions, he insisted. ‘That’, held his 
first and most important article, ‘Sir Kirke will reveal the commission of the King of Great 
Britain, by virtue of which he wants to seize this place, and if it is an act of legitimate warfare 
between France and England’.64 Just why Champlain was so desperate to see David Kirke’s 
letters of marque, which apparently permitted the naturalised Englishman to ‘seize this place’ 
in a wartime gesture, is not to be long guessed at. He clearly hoped that his surrender to the 
Kirkes would be considered a public, rather than a private, cession back in Europe. For this 
reason, the response of Lewis and Thomas, who told Champlain that neither of them had any 
royal paperwork to show him, would have jarred his mind: the brothers claimed – with a bluff, 
perhaps, of their own – that David kept the ‘commission’ with him at Tadoussac. Champlain 
was told not to worry, however, for Lewis and Thomas enjoyed ‘every power to treat’ with 
him, ‘as you will soon see’, they confirmed. Champlain was convinced, apparently, and from 
this point onwards, his position became one of submission to the Kirkes. He along with several 
other Frenchmen – some of them representing the new company, others the residual traders of 
the old merchant groups – were taken captive and ferried eastward across the Atlantic by David 
and Thomas Kirke, who carried the seized furs and munitions with them, leaving Lewis and a 
trading contingent behind him.  
 
The substance and validity of David Kirke’s ‘commission’ remain something of a mystery. 
That, following an elaborate ceremony of surrender, both Champlain and David Kirke applied 
their signatures to Champlain’s articles of capitulation suggests that Champlain saw the 
relevant paperwork and was convinced by what he saw, but this is not at all clear from first-
hand accounts.65 For all parties involved in the dispute, it remained to be seen whether or not 
the surrender of Québec would be acknowledged in a post-war context during the diplomatic 
negotiations associated therewith, and therefore, by extension, whether or not the settlements 
of Québec and Tadoussac – along with the 1,713 furs taken during the Kirkes’s occupation 
– might be restored to French private interests via the French crown.  
 
Diplomatic developments in Europe transpiring immediately after the departure of the Kirkes 
for New France would make all the difference in this respect. On April 24th, the Treaty of 
Susa, foreshadowing the closure of the Anglo-French War, was signed, restoring the ‘ancient 
alliances’ and bonne volonté of the two crowns. More specifically, this treaty negated the 
activity of all vessels ‘still at sea with letters of marque’, returning ‘all seized property [pris] 
taken within the space of two months to be restored to either side’, under the assumption, right 
as it turned out, that outright peace would prevail between England and France after this 
period.66 Thus could the seizure of Québec in the summer of 1629 be considered a peacetime 
event, paving the way for its restoration to France during the settlement of terms, the 
culmination of which was the Treaty of Saint-Germaine-en-Laye in March of 1632. The 
harmonisation of private and public claims for restitution was therefore set to play an important 
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part of these negotiations, as Charles de l’Aubespine, the Marquis de Châteauneuf, made his 
way to London from Paris to hasten a result, and Sir Thomas Edmondes, now on his final 
diplomatic mission, made his way to Paris from London for the same purpose.67 
 
When David and Thomas Kirke touched at Dover on their return from New France on October 
27th 1629, most of their French captives were released for their home passage to be organised. 
A handful stayed on, bearing uncertain political status in England. Among them was Samuel 
Champlain. Discovering that his earlier capitulation at Québec had taken place subsequent to 
the declaration of peace in London and Susa, Champlain now felt a sense of obligation to secure 
the return of the Laurentinian settlements to the Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France. After he 
and the others were ferried to London on the 30th, Champlain received an audience with the 
French ambassadeur extraordinaire, Châteauneuf, to whom he provided a detailed testimony. 
Together, the pair appear to have reached the conclusion that their best chance of a first-
instance remedy was through the High Court of Admiralty. Admiralty jurisdiction in England, 
besides hearing prize matters, covered contracts and torts upon the high seas. This jurisdiction 
quite often extended more broadly than this, controversially, to compete with the courts of 
common law. Selectively receptive of Roman law and the customary laws of the sea, 
adjudications of the admiralty courts were more prone to variability than the common law, 
because juries played no part, precedents were not always revered, judges were often 
sympathetic towards influential merchants of the ports in question, and appeals, if permitted, 
went straight to the Chancellor who could intervene personally or arrange for a trial at equity 
away from the common law. What admiralty lacked in reputation for partiality towards 
foreigners, however, it made up for with its straightforward approach to rules and evidence 
concerning simple disputes over unlawful captures at sea.68 With cautious optimism, therefore, 
Champlain approached Sir Henry Marten of the High Court of Admiralty in order to lodge 
formal statements with the judge on the 7th and 9th of November. These catalogued the 
Compagnie’s miserable stores at the time of the capitulation, but confirmed also that good 
treatment had been afforded by the Kirkes.69 Tellingly, it was also put onto the record ‘that no 
ransom ought to be demanded for their release, as they are not lawful prisoners of war, having 
been taken upon a plantation’, which seemed to imply that a private claim for restitution 
warranted consideration outside of the circumstances of war.70 Shortly after this, Champlain 
was given leave for Paris where he would make the case for the Compagnie de la Nouvelle-
France before Richelieu and Louis XIII personally. While Champlain actively sought the 
restoration of New France to the Cent Associés, and liaised with several officials in Paris to 
achieve that end, the separate matter of the furs came to a head in London. David and Thomas 
Kirke declared before admiralty that they had seized into ‘the Companies hands’, after the 
surrender of ‘the forte of Quebecke’, ‘no more than 1713 Beaver Skinnes in the forte & 
habitation’; additionally, they claimed to have ‘traded w[i]th the Natives of the Countrye for 
4540 Beaver Skinnes’.71 Those furs apparently acquired through fair trade could not be 
disputed, the Kirkes claimed. Rather, it was the 1,713 furs, which had been the property not of 
the Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France, but of its predecessor the Compagnie de Caën, acquired 
in an act of privateering of dubious legality, that would spark a controversial dispute between 
these interests. Unlike the Saint-Sauveur fiasco with De Pons, then, moveable property, not 
immoveable property, would take centre stage in this dispute. 
 
During the second of the raids upon New France, Émery de Caën had been on his final 
permitted voyage to the St. Lawrence, just after the ratification of the Treaty of Susa, in order 
to wind off the old company’s operations and to retrieve its remaining inventory, when he fell 
victim to the raids of the Kirkes. When Guillaume de Caën learned of his cousin’s misfortune 
in November, he promptly made his way from France to the Thames in order to have his stolen 
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furs restored, if somewhat naïve – as all in his position would have been – of the smoke and 
mirrors awaiting him at port. De Caën’s first step in London was to approach the resident 
ambassador, just as it had been Champlain’s. Châteauneuf, hearing of these separate concerns, 
was then satisfied to collate them with the demands of the Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France 
into a Latin memorial for Charles I’s attention sometime in January.72 Châteauneuf had already 
received assurances from Charles, back in April of 1629, appearing to suggest that ‘restitutio’ 
would be considered for ‘Capitane de Caen’.73 This time, however, it was the Lords Committee 
for Foreign Affairs to assume the responsibility for responding to these renewed demands, as 
Charles, whether embarrassed or indifferent, hid from sight.74 In their reply to the ambassador, 
the lords promised separate investigations into the ‘fort & habitation of Quebic taken by 
Captayne Kirke’, and the ‘skinnes brought from Canada’.75 The inevitable return of Québec 
was all but a fait accompli by this stage, but just which court had jurisdiction over the furs, and 
what kind of jurisdiction that would be – besides, where, how, and why – was all left unsaid. 
A month passed before a special commission of enquiry composed of London’s finest lawyers 
was launched ‘to discover what goods, merchandise, and other things have been taken by Capt. 
David Kirke’ – which, evidently, was proving the more complicated question posed by 
Châteauneuf.76 Testimonies were again collected, before Whitehall unexpectedly intervened. 
By an Order of the Privy Council of April 2nd, Sir James Campbell, the lord mayor of London, 
was ordered to auction the disputed furs before only the French and English interests 
contending for them.77 Whomsoever was prepared to make the highest ‘offer for the Beaver 
Skins now in question’, the Privy Council confirmed, would receive all the 1,713 furs kept in 
storage upon payment to the mayor, with the whole process to be supervised by the admiralty 
judge.78 This was presumably intended to speed up the process, but it was hardly a satisfactory 
outcome for Guillaume de Caën. As he needed to return to France, where his attention was 
required for domestic legal disputes that would keep him preoccupied until well into the 1640s, 
De Caën perceived it in his best interest to register the highest bid and retrieve the furs with a 
view to seeking the restitution of the amount paid later in a separate suit. He tendered 25 
shillings per pound and was awarded the prize on April 9th.79  
 
After lodging a considerable deposit, however, De Caën was prevented access to the locked 
warehouse containing the furs. He therefore had to return to France empty-handed. There was 
only time, before his ship’s departure in mid-April, to give power of attorney to Jacques 
Reynard, and to lodge a petition with the Privy Council threatening a new suit for damages and 
costs. The Kirkes had evidently outplayed the De Caëns again. And they would continue to do 
so. When the lord mayor, at the end of the auction, asked for the key to the warehouse, David 
Kirke refused to hand it over.80 When a public notary then approached Kirke after De Caën’s 
departure and asked for the same, the story had changed; now, David Kirke said, the key was 
lost, with its last known whereabouts being with his mother, who no longer knew where she 
had put it.81 The Kirkes still worked, as they ever had, in a family business! When, two weeks 
later, the Admiralty intervened and issued a warrant for the Lord Mayor and Sheriffs of London 
to break into the warehouse and deliver the contents to De Caën’s appointed representative, 
there would be one final act of defiance on the part of the Kirkes.82 Only around 300 furs were 
found inside, some 1,400 less than expected.  
 
Over the next two weeks, it emerged that a Londoner, Thomas Fittz, had received a mysterious 
tipoff and subsequently paid a bargain price for the furs sometime in April. His apprehension 
came at the end of the following month. For his ‘notorious misdemeanor’, Fittz was sent by 
the Privy Council to the Fleet Prison on July 2nd, and summonsed to appear before the Court 
of Star Chamber two weeks later.83 This was where the Privy Council heard formal trials, and 
also where the king’s personal control over proceedings and outcomes was notorious, 
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particularly in trials where fiscal penalties could be imposed. Fittz was a small fry, however, 
so his detention and interrogation were brief affairs. Because he was prepared to disclose the 
whereabouts of the missing furs to the Attorney General, the Privy Council looked 
sympathetically upon his complaints of ‘great loss’, and so granted his freedom on shortly later 
on July 14th.84 Finally, a grand total of 1,713 furs were loaded upon a ship bound for Dieppe, 
where they were reunited with their rightful owner, Guillaume de Caën, but to whom the matter 
was anything but finished. He was busy preparing a new suit, which went much further than a 
simple denial that the cost of recuperating the furs was his burden. Now, in the early months 
of 1631, he claimed a total of 4,266 furs had been wrongfully accumulated by the Kirkes, and 
moreover he complained about the appropriation of his trading ships and the general 
impediments to trade left by the Kirkes after 1629. Procedurally, the matter was now more 
complicated, and called for more diplomatic intervention. In pursuit of his new claims, De 
Caën presented his complaints to the English ambassador to France, Sir Isaac Wake, sometime 
in April. Wake’s predecessor, Edmondes, does not appear to have shown much concern for the 
issue before his replacement in early 1630. Lacking sufficient evidence to make any decisive 
overtures, Wake, in his delicate position, seems to have looked favourably on the De Caëns, as 
he sought clarification on the discrepancy in the number of furs back in England.85  
 
This prompted the sulking return of David Kirke, whose remaining furs were by this stage 
being held under sequestration by Admiralty, to Henry Marten on May 27th, 1631.86 For the 
first time, he was forced onto the defensive. He reiterated his original statements and 
maintained a firm distinction between furs traded and furs seized. Their ‘Commission under 
the broade seale of England’, he reminded Marten, had permitted the brothers ‘utterly to expell 
[the French] from that Country’. After doing so, all the furs acquired in Québec came into his 
possession lawfully through trade, not by theft, he declared.87  
 
In France, a different interpretation prevailed. After Émery and Guillaume de Caën registered 
their request for recompense with a mobile French court commissioned especially by Louis 
XIII to make a record of outstanding grievances before the negotiations of the final peace, the 
cousins grew in confidence. As neither the Kirkes nor any of their representatives were present 
at the relevant hearing of the court, the figures claimed by the Compagnie de Caën here went 
unchallenged.88 Wake was powerless, at this stage, to intervene, and could do no more than 
send warnings home about the claim for 4,266 furs. The High Court of Admiralty in London 
then prepared to be faced with the requests of the De Caën cousins for damages once more. 
Throughout the winter months of late 1631 and early 1632, duplicates were ordered from the 
court of all relevant inventories and testimonies. These were sent quickly to Wake, whom 
everyone in England and Scotland increasingly hoped would be able to resolve the affair 
without further significant investigation.89  
 
Wake in this period was consumed with negotiations in Saint-Germaine-en-Laye, where all 
matters of restitution, public and private, were finally slated for consideration. Here, the 
differences of opinion between the Kirkes and the De Caëns were definitively to be addressed 
not by themselves or by their solicitors but by their diplomatic countrymen. Wake, still 
apparently sympathetic to the De Caën cousins, resolved to see their claims honoured in these 
negotiations. Upon the great balance sheet of the profits and losses compiled in this period, he 
uncritically accepted the figures presented to him by the French and overlooked the original 
depositions collected back in November of 1629. This was a large claim for damages, reaching 
a total of £14,330 (£8,270 for the furs, plus £6,060 for losses in the trade and the appropriation 
of ships belonging to the Compagnie de Caën). When news of this sum reached England, it 
was reputed with much indignation. The Kirkes were completely caught off-guard. They and 
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the other ‘Canada adventurers’ expected Wake to advance their own interests at the bargaining 
table, not those of the Compagnie de Caën. Instead, as they complained in a long and detailed 
letter of protest to Wake, their own predicament had been disregarded. They were prepared to 
admit the need to ‘have made restitution’ with the French. But to their minds, such restitution 
needed only to have covered the value of the goods actually taken from the stores of Québec 
and the ship of Émery de Caën and nothing more.90 Crucially, however, the Kirkes were no 
longer directly concerned in the matter. When Wake gave his formal assurances to the De 
Caëns that a large sum would be paid them for compensation, the Kirkes were not the ones left 
with the responsibility for covering it. Instead, that responsibility fell to Charles I. For this 
reason, the secretary of state, Sir John Coke, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Francis 
Cottington, were both aghast to learn of Wake’s generosity. They felt that the English diplomat 
to France had yielded when he ought not have, burdening Charles I with a debt exorbitantly 
excessive of the true value of the damages. The king reluctantly authorised the payment – or, 
more accurately, consented to its deduction from the amount owed him by the French – and 
the public component of this legal dispute came to an end.91  
 
The extraordinary private dispute between the Kirkes and the De Caëns endured beyond the 
signing of the Treaty of Saint-Germaine-en-Laye. Émery de Caën, whom Richelieu nominated 
in 1632 to oversee the withdrawal of the English from Québec, was stalled throughout late June 
and July by Lewis Kirke and his colleagues, who had kept the fort since 1629. The credentials 
of De Caën, they argued, were deficient of authority to evict them from New France! They 
could hold this line while dragging their feet for no longer than a few weeks, though, before 
giving up Québec in mid-July – apparently, however, engulfed in flames. So the De Caën 
cousins found themselves once again with another claim for outstanding damages. Although 
Richelieu offered his soothing assurances to Guillaume that he would soon have his remedy, 
effectively it was his own manoeuvre – handing the keys of New France to the Compagnie de 
la Nouvelle-France – which put Samuel de Champlain back in the driving seat and squeezed the 
De Caëns out of the picture for good.92 The details of what follows are sketchy, but it can only 
be suggestive of his misfortunes that Guillaume’s name shows up a few times among the 
subjects of malady in the records of the Amirauté de France in 1642, the central admiralty court 
where lodgements could be made directly or otherwise on appeal from one of the dozens of 
miniature admiralty courts situated along the coast of France.93 In one such instance, 
Guillaume’s name appears upon an application for a writ against the Kirkes to the tune of 
137,000 livres.94 This request does not appear to have been redirected to the king or his conseil, 
and so, it seems, was allowed to subside in the interests of preserving the hesitant alliance 
between England and France during the latter stages of the Thirty Years War. The Kirkes 
likewise sought restitution for many years after their humiliation in 1632, and not only that, 
they sought revenge. Complaining of the costs associated with the abandonment of the trade, 
the evacuation of Québec, and the delivery of remaining inventory back to Europe, the brothers 
registered their demands of more than £4,000 from Guillaume de Caën with Secretary Coke in 
1633. Coke may have looked sympathetically on their claim, but with the peacetime 
negotiations well and truly wrapped up, there was little scope for the suit to be brought by any 
ambassadors, and no court ambitious enough to exercise jurisdiction either side of the Channel. 
The next step of the Kirkes was telling: to make several requests between 1633 to 1636 for ‘the 
King’s letters’, so that they might ‘right themselves’ in Canada. Their efforts in England, and 
subsequent activities on the St. Lawrence and in Newfoundland, would ultimately prove 
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Focusing upon ‘private undertakings’ in conflict with one another off the distant coastlines of 
the Atlantic world allows for a better understanding of some of the peculiar relationships that 
were developing between commercial interests and resident ambassadors in early modern 
Europe. Through these relationships were the conditions generated for the first attempts to 
resolve disputes emerging away from Europe through legal and political institutions set within 
it.  
 
Both case studies in this article highlight how important it was for the earliest merchant 
interests in the Atlantic New World to have resident ambassadors vouching for them in England 
and France. The language of tort, central to which were the concepts of damaged interests and 
personal liabilities, was more effectively mobilised than making recourse to the ‘law of 
nations’, whatever that was in this period. But it was never easy to proceed much further than 
issuing a complaint. Sometimes diplomats failed to find a forum in which to register protests 
or counter-protests on behalf of private interests. At other times, they were expected to sacrifice 
smaller claims altogether in the interests of advancing heftier matters of state. Private actors, 
for their part, had to take every opportunity they could get to have their particular pleas heard. 
Sometimes this meant bending the truth, exaggerating the value of losses, concealing evidence, 
or just dallying.  
 
The principal utility of this comparison is its exposure of the impact of war and peace upon 
private claims for restitution. Depredations committed during wartime, under the authority of 
letters of marque, were treated very differently to those which were not. Both voyages of 
Argall, and the second of the two voyages of the Kirkes, carried very different legal 
consequences in Europe to the first voyage of the Kirke brothers, it emerges here. And everyone 
knew it. Champlain, of the Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France, in collusion with Châteuneuf, 
the special ambassador, was noticeably eager to clarify that the French captives were ‘not 
lawful prisoners of war’, but were rather ‘taken upon a plantation’, after the peace of Susa. 
Over the next three years, as peacetime negotiations consumed elected statesmen from England 
and France, the De Caën cousins pressed for their private claims to be placed upon the agenda 
too – an avenue which would not have been available to them had the war in the Channel gone 
on for a few months longer than it did. Prior to this, it had been the Kirkes who first played on 
the distinction between plundering through war, and accumulating through trade, in order to 
separate the public legal issues from the private legal issues associated with the capture and 
return of Québec. But in the end it was the Compagnie de Caën to use this context best to its 
gain and became the recipients of £14,330. This might have been somewhat too generous, but 
regardless it was certainly far greater than would have been awarded were it not for the 
willingness of Wake to consider the claim at face value. Thus were private claims for damages 
subsumed within a public act of restitution, largely on the whims of the ambassadors involved, 
and without much input, in the end, from the courts.  
 
Trading companies extending themselves beyond their home jurisdictions into the extra-
European world knowingly took a risk, investing pools of capital into expeditions bound for 
unpredictable and largely unknown markets. The risk of this investment was amplified by the 
presence of other Europeans, which was by no means an insignificant variable. A competitive 
trade made life more difficult for companies in the New World. Of course, competitive markets 
were annoying to companies in the free ports of Europe too. But what was unique to the extra-
European world in the early seventeenth century was the absence of local and unbiased avenues 
for redress in the event of damages incurred upon the particular interests operating there. If 
these conditions and others like them are profitably to be seen to represent a state of ‘legal 
pluralism’, then it might be important to qualify that each group of foreign interests operating 
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along the coasts and ‘corridors’ of the New World were always inclined to abide by their own 
rules and procedures unless – or until – coercion by force of arms made legal seclusionism of 
this kind no longer feasible. Episodic violence was sometimes justified by letters of marque 
but at other times required no justification. This was no context congenial to dispute resolution. 
 
A predicament of jurisdictional deficiency was disadvantageous to all merchants attempting to 
profit from foreign markets. Even if the more substantive kind of ‘company-state’ bore less of 
this burden than the smaller companies did, it remains noteworthy that all private interests, 
whether individual or corporate, found themselves relying upon state actors to rehearse their 
claims for damages through existing judicial and diplomatic organs within their metropolitan 
European domiciles. This is of some importance. However imperfectly grievances about ‘grand 
torts’ abroad were aired by those involved in all such cases, it was through this kind of 
advocacy that some of the earliest distinctions were made between private international law 
and public international law in European history, regardless of how rudimentarily and crudely 
these interventions appear in relation to more modern efforts to fortify the same distinction.96 
Only during the long nineteenth century would courts in Europe and America develop more 
accommodating jurisprudence in regard to ‘alien torts’ and ‘conflicts of laws’. Paradoxically, 
however, this led to costlier and fussier litigation, and accordingly, more arbitration and 
settlements away from courts. Well before all of this took place, there was a brief period in 
early modern history in which it made sense to establish basic standards, and to erect special 
judicial institutions, for trading companies interacting with each other in the New World. Such 
moves never took place, it might be speculated, for two principal reasons. First of all, this 
would have been too far out of step with the politics of mercantilism, which saw the unification 
of policies of war and trade by national legislatures in this period. The other factor to consider 
is the growth in power of the European state, which was centralising, rather than delegating, 
its authority over subjects at home and abroad. That international law was so determined by 
intranational developments is part of what makes this subject so intriguing, and yet so 
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